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and Rule of Law in Lebanon* 
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Introduction
Much of the time, transitional justice measures are developed alongside the 
implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts, and are 
expected by their framers and advocates to contribute to peace.  The claim is 
that accountability measures can help to deter future violence and prevent 
revenge attacks, demonstrate and help to reinstall the rule of law and 
democracy, and contribute in so doing to longer-term stability. And indeed, 
transitional justice measures are expected to work alongside specific 
measures of peacebuilding, such as rule of law promotion, security sector 
reform, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of 
excombatants, and increasingly those developing such measures of 
peacebuilding are expected to take transitional justice measures into
account.1
* This is a draft paper.
What happens, however, when a transitional justice measure is 
developed decades after the end of the conflict, where such standard 
measures of peacebuilding were not pursued, or are incomplete?  Can a 
transitional justice mechanism have the desired effects?  And what if that 
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1 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General.  United Nations Approach to Transitional 
Justice (March 2010) at 
http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf. 
SOAS School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
Research Paper No.  16 / 2010 
www.soas.ac.uk/law/researchpapers 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701891
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM 2
This is a draft  paper.  
mechanism is not designed to address the wide range of past crimes, but a 
more recent subset? 
This chapter considers the prospects for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) to have any serious impact on the country itself, against the backdrop 
of long-term, but unconsolidated, peacebuilding or reconstruction efforts.  It
argues that while Lebanon has undergone extensive reconstruction since the 
end of its brutal civil war, no serious peacebuilding efforts were undertaken, 
meaning that many of the changes a post-conflict society is expected to 
undergo, arising from demobilization of large numbers of fighters, reform of 
the justice and security sector, did not take place.  In this context, 
accountability for the abuses of the war and in the 15 years after it in which 
the country was under Syrian occupation has yet to take place and seems 
unlikely. The STL is nonetheless often expected to operate as a mechanism 
analogous to ordinary transitional justice mechanisms, yet it does not have 
the remit to address the legacy of conflict and occupation, but rather only 
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and related 
assassinations.  It seems unlikely that it can have the effect expected of 
transitional justice mechanisms and ascribed by its advocates to it as well, of 
promoting human rights and accountability, and even peacebuilding, in the 
affected country.  Rather, after two decades of reconstruction, the tribunal is 
unlikely to contribute to peace, and may run the risk of promoting conflict 
should it try defendants, whether in person or in absentia.
Background: the conflict and its termination
Lebanon experienced a brutal civil war from 1975-1990, and a brief 
resurgence of violence following the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri in 2005. The conflict was based on sectarian violence amongst 
militias and between the militia and the government, with significant 
regional dimensions.  In 1976 Syria invaded Lebanon, which it would later 
recast as an Arab Deterrent Force, or a peacekeeping force, and remained an 
occupying power. Israel also invaded southern Lebanon and put in place a 
‘buffer zone’ which remains today. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
peacekeeping force was put in place in Southern Lebanon in 1978 to 
monitor Israeli withdrawal, and remains in place today.
Official estimates of deaths during the civil war are of about 145,000 deaths 
of which some 90% were civilians, 185,000 wounded, 2000 women killed 
for having been raped, and 800,000 displaced.  In addition to Lebanese 
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM 3
This is a draft  paper.  
citizens killed and displaced during the conflict, many disappeared, and 
their numbers and fate have still not been determined, although official 
estimates stand at about 17,000.2 Others disappeared or have been held in 
Syrian prisons, many as political prisoners, although this is a charge Syria 
denies.3
In 1989, the Ta’if agreement was negotiated by surviving members of the 
pre-war Parliament, with brokerage by regional states, which proposed to 
heal national rifts and promote reconciliation (it was also titled the Charter 
of National Reconciliation), develop administrative and political reforms, 
disarm militias, reaffirm sovereignty, and engage in “Lebanonization”.
While it reinforced the need for Israeli withdrawal, it emphasized the 
importance of Syrian-Lebanon relations.  Lebanon remained, following the 
end of the conflict, under heavy Syrian influence.  While under the Taif 
agreement Syrian troops, then at a strength of 40,000, were to be redeployed 
to the Bekaa valley and removed, they remained in the country, and were 
only fully removed  in 2005 under heavy international pressure (UNSC 
resolution 1559). 
The Hezbollah militia continues to maintain significant control in southern 
Lebanon and poor suburbs of Beirut, and has not demobilized. In 2006, a 
short war between Israel and Hezbollah militants operating in southern 
Lebanon further devastated the country.
Meanwhile, the politics are shaped not only by confessionalism, discussed 
further below, but by rivalries between the March 8th and March 14th
coalitions. These coalitions are particularly split over the creation and 
operation of the Special Tribunal.  The March 8th coalition, comprised of the 
Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah, allied with the Free Patriotic movement, 
refers to the date of a rally organized in 2005 to thank Syria for its 
involvement in the country.  They view the creation of the tribunal as 
external interference in Lebanon.  The March 14th coalition refers to the date 
in 2005 in which 1 million Lebanese protested in the streets, calling for 
Syrian withdrawal and an international investigation of the Hariri 
assassination.  The coalition comprises the largely Sunni Future Movement 
founded by Hariri, several Christian parties, the Lebanese Forces (formerly 
2  Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar, and Lynn Maalouf, “Early reflections on local 
perceptions, legitimacy and legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice volume 5 (2007), pp. 1065-81, at 1068; Iolanda Jaquemet, 
“Fighting Amnesia: Ways to Uncover the Truth about Lebanon’s Missing,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice vol. 3, issue 1 (2008), pp. 1-18, at 1.
3 Author’s interview with observer who requested anonymity (Beirut, September 2009).
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a militia within the lChristian-dominated Lebanese Front, now a political 
party), and the Progressive Socialist Party, and supports the tribunal and 
rejects Syrian involvement in Lebanon.4
Peacebuilding?
The situation in Lebanon was somewhat unique in that much of the primary 
post-conflict  economic reconstruction activities were not only 
internationally, but also internally generated and regionally-supported, 
particularly with the support of wealthy Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who 
was able to obtain a mix of grants and loans from oil-rich gulf states 
alongside western donors. The emphasis, however, has been less on 
peacebuilding and more on physical reconstruction, with gulf donors and 
Hariri emphasizing physical reconstruction projects and Western donors 
emphasizing technical support to governance reform.5 If it is difficult, 
approximately 20 years after the Taif agreement, to characterize most 
activities seeking to rebuild Lebanon as peacebuilding rather than 
reconstruction, this may be in significant part due to the environment in 
which any peacebuilding might be attempted.
Challenges to peacebuilding: the operating environment 
Governance, sectarianism and clientelism
There are significant structural challenges to long-term peacebuilding in 
Lebanon.6 The country is technically a parliamentary democracy, with 
power-sharing in governance.7
4 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early reflections”.
However, because of the dominance of 
political parties by particular sectarian groups traditionally, and the 
consolidation of power in the hands of a few powerful politicians, political 
parties lack much significance.  The prevalence of clientelism increases this 
phenomenon.  While the Ta’if agreement sought to break clientelism by 
5 Are Knudsen, “Precarious peacebuilding: Post-war Lebanon, 1990-2005,” CMI Working 
Paper (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2005); Christine Sylva Hamieh and Roger 
MacGinty, “A very political reconstruction: governance and reconstruction in Lebanon 
after the 2006 war,” Disasters vol. 34 (2010) pp. S103-S123.
6 Martin Kraft, Muzna Al-Mazri, Heiko Wimmen, and Natascha Zupan, “Walking the Line: 
Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon,” (Bonn: Working Group on 
Development and Peace, German Development Service, and Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, 
December 2008), pp. 15-24.
7  See Arab Reform Initiative and Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “The 
State of Reform in the Arab World 2009-10,” (Arab Reform Initiative, March 2010), 
www.arab-reform.net. 
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stipulating that voting be in governates, or large administrative units, 
elections have regularly violated its terms with district-based and uni-
confessional voting. The Lebanese Constitution of 1926, as amended in 
1990, stipulates the abolition of confessionalism in article 95, but has yet to 
be implemented.8 Power-sharing arrangements have been used repeatedly to 
address immediate crises of governance, often leaving underlying 
grievances unaddressed.
It is unclear whether peacebuilding in any traditional sense, including the 
(re)building of a strong and unitary state, is feasible in the country.  
Sectarian parties have an interest in a weak state so that they are able to 
pursue their own interests, according to some experts, and individuals define 
themselves as much or more through sectarian identities than as Lebanese. 9
One observer, pointing out that state weakness left vacuums that were filled 
by Hezbollah, Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, and Christian factions, 
suggested that there were really many small strong states within a weak 
larger state.10 Further, each sectarian group has its own regional patrons, 
variously Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iran. These factors make 
state consolidation difficult.
The regional environment
Any efforts at building peace and promoting justice in Lebanon do not 
operate in a vacuum.  Obviously, Lebanon is in an unstable region, and 
subject to influences from regional powers noted above, even after the 
Syrian withdrawal from its territory.  Israel only withdrew from a security 
zone it occupied in the south of the country in 2000, and in 2006 fought a 
war with Hezbollah. The presence of a large number of Palestinian refugees 
living in poor conditions in refugee camps is both a source of political 
dispute and security concerns.  Many observers suggest that genuine peace 
8 The Constitution of Lebanon (1926, as amended 1990), at 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/le00000_.html#A095_ (accessed 12 December 2009). See 
generally Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 
2001); Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2007); 
Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: A House Divided (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006);  Author’s 
interview with Gaëlle Kibranian, Lebanese Transparency Association (Beirut, September 
2009).
9 Kraft, Al-Mazri, Wimmen, and Zupan, “Walking the Line,” pp. 5-6, 20-21; Author’s 
interview with Bassel Salloukh, Lebanese American University (Beirut, September 2009). 
Author’s interview with Father Fady Fadel, Antonine University (Beirut, September 2009).
10 Author’s interview with Sylva Hamieh (Beirut, September 2009). (speaking in personal 
capacity)
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in Lebanon will not be feasible in the absence of a broader regional 
settlement, which would include a fair solution for Palestinians.11
Unfinished demobilization of combatants
The Ta’if agreement sparked new fighting between the Lebanese Forces, the 
largest militia, and the interim prime minister, General Michel Aoun, in 
1990.   A general amnesty, offering militia leaders posts in government, 
helped end the fighting, and some 50,000 fighters part of 24 militias 
disarmed by April 1991. Militias also had members integrated into the new 
Lebanon army, although all sought to integrate more than was feasible.
However, there was widespread disarmament, if variation in willingness to 
hand over or canton weapons.  The Druze and Amal militias tended to 
comply with the process, and also handed over heavy weaponry to the 
Syrians.  Former Amal militia were heavily integrated into the state forces
because of the group’s ties to the state and the rise of its leader, Nabih Berri, 
to be speaker of the parliament. Unlike many countries emerging from 
conflict, there was no internationally-supported DDR process.
Two critical exceptions are to be noted.  Hezbollah, viewed by many as a 
liberator from Israeli occupation, was allowed to keep its arms.  Members of 
the LF were unable to take full advantage of DDR programmes and very 
few were allowed to be integrated into the new army or civilian posts, and 
tended to rely upon militia and family networks for reintegration. Many 
militia members did not seek inclusion in state forces because they had 
other opportunities, as they were established in legal businesses or in 
smuggling.12
The lasting impact of the failure to conduct DDR in Lebanon, according to  
one observer, has been not only continued sectarianism, but continued 
“territorialization of security,” with factions controlling different sectors of 
the country, and providing or undermining security. Such groups, including 
but not limited to Hezbollah, compete with one another and with the 
legitimate state providers of security. The continued possibility of factional 
violence was demonstrated in the street fighting between Hezbollah and 
Amal militia members which occurred in May 2008.13
11 Author’s interview with Julien Courson, Alef (Beirut, September 2009). Author’s 
interview with Kamel Mohanna, Director, Amel Association (Beirut, September 2009).
12 Knudsen, “Precarious Peacebuilding,” pp. 12-13; Author’s interview with Paul Salem, 
Director, Carnegie Middle East Center (Beirut, September 2009).
13 Author’s interview with Siad Darwish, Peace Permanent Movement (Beirut, September 
2009). Ghaith Abdul Ahad, “Ghaith Abdul Ahad reports on the street battle in Lebanon,” 
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Sectarianism and the security forces
The possibility of security sector reform is limited, largely for the reasons 
that have been noted already.  The state security forces, the ISF, do not 
control all the territory, and are widely viewed as, like the judiciary, politics, 
and other aspects of public life, shaped by sectarianism and patronage.14
Militia members were to be incorporated into the ISF following 
rehabilitation, but in general they were simply incorporated without any 
rehabilitation process.15 The army is considered to be a more professional 
and truly national institution, but it too is affected by sectarianism.16 And, as 
one observer noted, without true disarmament of the more general 
population and militias, which would leave the security forces with the 
monopoly on weapons and use of force, reform will prove difficult.17 The 
army continues to respond to internal security issues rather than confining 
itself to external security because the ISF has lacked the capacity to control 
militias or larger demonstrations.18
Human rights and rule of law
While the judiciary is formally independent sectarian divisions are said to 
interfere in its management by the Supreme Judicial Council.19 The 
judiciary is considered widely to be corrupt and subject to political 
manipulation.20 More generally, it is very slow and inefficient.21
The Guardian (10 May 2008), at 
However, 
there are exceptional judges who have displayed independence and 
professionalism and have applied international human rights and refugee 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/10/lebanon.syria. 
14 Kraft, Al-Mazri, Wimmen, and Zupan, “Walking the Line,” p. 10, 33-35; Yezid Sayigh, 
‘”Fixing Broken Windows’: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen,” 
Carnegie Papers no. 17 (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, October 2009); Author’s 
interview with Salloukh.
15 Author’s interview with Salloukh.
16 Aram Nerguizian and Anthony Cordesman, “The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges 
and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 10 February 2009). Author’s interview with Salloukh. Author’s 
interview with Hamieh. Author’s interview with Salem.
17 Author’s interview with Darwish.
18 Author’s interview with Jeremy Cornforth, Political and Economic Counsellor, Embassy 
of the United States of America (Beirut, September 2009).
19 Kraft, Al-Mazri, Wimmen, and Zupan, “Walking the line,” pp. 31-3.
20 Author’s interview with Julien Courson, Alef (Beirut, September 2009). Expert speaking 
on condition of anonymity (Beirut, September 2009).
21 Author’s interview with Salem.
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law in their decisions.22 Thus, while most judges have the proper training, 
unlike in many countries where capacity-building is a necessary first step, 
the real challenge is the reform of the politicized environment in which they 
operate.23
There are some positive signs of the prospects for human rights and the rule 
of law, albeit limited ones. President Michel Suleiman has publicly stated an 
interest in promoting judicial reform, and appointed as minister of the 
interior a former civil society activist, Ziad Baroud, who has promoted 
electoral reform.  However, Suleiman and Baroud are considered by some 
observers as weak and/or exceptions to the rule, and reform will prove 
challenging given the sectarian nature of the polity, as well as the reliance of
some judges on political patrons for their positions.24 The minister of 
justice, also a reformist, proposed the abolition of the death penalty in the 
summer of 2009, but it was politically controversial and was not presented
to Parliament amid a broader cabinet crisis.25 The country also ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention in 2008, which obligates it to 
create a national office of prevention of torture within a year, which as of 
this writing has not been created.26
Accountability and impunity
The absence of transitional justice mechanisms
In many countries emerging from violent conflict or repression, domestic 
trials are debated, if not held, and other measures such as commissions of 
inquiry, reparations, and commemorations may be utilized.  However, the 
Amnesty Law of 1991 (law 94/91), provides for amnesty for all crimes, 
making it impossible to try war crimes, crimes against humanity, and forced 
disappearances domestically, but excluding political assassination from the 
amnesty.  In general, there have been very few prosecutions for clear abuses 
of human rights or violations of humanitarian law, although there has been 
22 Author’s interview with Fateh Azzam, Regional Representative, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (Beirut, September 2009).
23 Author’s phone interview with Nadim Houry, Human Rights Watch (Beirut, Setember 
2009).
24 Author’s interview with Salloukh. Author’s interview with Darwish. Author’s interview 
with Hamieh. Author’s interview with Salem.
25 Lebanon: Justice ministry campaigns to abolish death penalty,” (29 August 2009) at  
http://www.handsoffcain.info/archivio_news/200908.php?iddocumento=12311666&mover
=0 (accessed 12 December 2009); Author’s interview with Azzam.
26 Expert speaking on condition of anonymity (Beirut, September 2009).
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selective prosecution.27 Thus Elias Hobeika, former leader of the Lebanese 
Forces (LF)  security agency and implicated in the 1982 Sabra and Shatila 
massacres, escaped prosecution and was elected to Parliament twice, only 
disgraced (and assassinated) following revelations of his involvement in the 
massacres in the context of attempts to prosecute Ariel Sharon.  However, 
Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, was imprisoned for life, 
accused of responsibility for a church bombing near Beirut in 1994, and the 
party outlawed.  He was given amnesty by the legislature in 2005.
There has been no plan for broader war crimes or human rights trials, and 
there are no policies in place for transitional justice mechanisms or a 
national reconciliation process.  Proposals for a national commemorative 
day for the civil war have been rejected.28 However, commemorative events 
in 2005, not long after the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, 
may have marked the beginning of a change in the so-called culture of 
amnesia. Absent official government efforts, civil society organizations in 
particular have developed memorials and recollection of the events of the 
civil war through films and documentaries.29 One former Christian militia 
leader, M Assad Shaftari, has also offered an apology.30
Nonetheless, there is relatively little public discussion of the past, and 
certainly no shared narrative regarding the conflict, although the latter is 
often difficult if not impossible.  Following the Ta’if accord, a committee 
was created to develop a history textbook which would be acceptable to all 
confessional groups, but the result was not endorsed, which means that 
different groups continue to learn from different textbooks, and indeed 
receive news from different sources which each have their own particular 
biases.31
27 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early reflections,” pp. 1066-69.
28 Knudsen, “Precarious peacebuilding,” p. 15.
29 Laurie King-Irani, “Commemorating Lebanon’s War Amid Continued Crisis,” Middle 
East Report Online (14 April 2005) http://merip.org/mero/mero041405.html; Author’s 
interview with Siad Darwish, who suggested there was increased openness to transitional 
justice at the public and political level, referring to television programmes with politicians 
discussing the war, and commemorative events. One observer suggests that the Hariri 
assassination itself created new political space, by generating international condemnation, 
some directed at Syria and Iran, lessening Syria’s influence in Lebanon. Author’s interview 
with Fadel. Author’s interview with Zeina el-Hélou, Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies 
(Beirut, September 2009).
30 M. Assad Shaftari, “Letter from a militia leader in Lebanon’s Civil War,” at 
http://www.caritas.org/activities/peace_reconciliation/Peacebuilding_Slideshow.html?cnt=
337 (accessed 10 December 2009);
31 United Nations Development Programme Lebanon, Peace Building Project Newsletter 
(1st Quarter 2009) on file with author. Stephen Dockery, “Journalists of all political colors 
attend media workshop,” The Daily Star (Beirut) (8 July 2009).
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM 10
This is a draft  paper.  
There has, similarly, been little done to address the fate of the disappeared 
or the needs of their relatives.32 While the government has issued official 
statistics on those disappeared alongside estimates of the dead and wounded, 
those are alleged to be inflated.  And while there have been two 
commissions of inquiry into the disappeared, one in 2000 and one in 2001,
the first published only a two page report, and the other none at all, in 
relation to  thousands of potential victims.33 Pursuit of detailed information 
about, or justice for, the disappeared was impossible during Syrian 
occupation remains difficult in light of the 1991 amnesty, political divides, 
and security concerns. Further, there has historically been a political divide 
between the two main organizations of families of the disappeared, although 
that has been bridged to some degree, and more vocal advocacy for 
information about the disappeared and opening of mass graves has been 
possible in recent years.34
The Hariri tribunal
There was widespread speculation in Lebanon and abroad about who might 
be responsible, with allegations that Hezbollah members, with Iran’s 
backing, might be responsible, or that Syria might have arranged for Hariri 
to be killed in order to maintain its influence in the country, or that both 
were responsible.35 Many in the international community felt that 
accountability was important, and that Lebanese courts were unlikely to be 
able to hear cases related to the assassination.  Thus the only significant, and 
the only externally-supported, attempt at accountability, is the Lebanon 
Special Tribunal, which was created to prosecute just a few crimes—the 14 
February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri and several 
related assassinations.36
32 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early reflections,” pp. 1067-68.
It may be a mistake to treat the tribunal as a 
mechanism of transitional justice in anything other than form, given that it 
was created long after the Ta’if agreement, although the withdrawal of Syria 
certainly constituted an important transition for the country. The question 
33 Jaquemet, “Fighting Amnesia,” pp. 5-6.
34 Jaquemet, “Fighting Amnesia,” pp. 6-8.
35 An article in a German magazine spurred particular controversy in 2009 for alleging that 
the Special Tribunal had evidence regarding Hezbollah’s role in the assassination and was 
keeping it secret.  Erich Follath, “New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder,” 
Spiegel Online (23 May 2009),  www.spiegel.de. 
36 One author, a Lebanese judge involved in the negotiations for the tribunal, says that the 
extension of the tribunal’s jurisdiction to attacks related to, but other than, that of Hariri 
was to deter the “serial political assassinations” that followed Hariri’s.  Choucri Sader, “A 
Lebanese Perspective on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, vol. 5 (2007), pp. 1083-1089.
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remains whether it could nonetheless catalyze efforts at broader 
accountability in the country.
The tribunal’s creation
Following the assassination, the United Nations Security Council 
established the mandate of a commission of inquiry in April 2005.37 That 
commission concluded that the assassination was carried out by a group 
with “extensive organization”, and indicated that some evidence pointed to 
Lebanese and Syrian involvement.  It transmitted evidence collected in its 
investigations to Lebanese judicial authorities and expressed the view that 
further investigations should be undertaken by domestic judicial and 
security forces.38 Whether members of Hezbollah or of the Syrian 
government are responsible, obtaining custody of them could be difficult.39
Following a resolution by the UN Security Council calling for a criminal 
tribunal in 2006, the UN and the government of Lebanon entered into 
agreement for the creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to prosecute 
individuals responsible for the organization of the Hariri assassination and 
related killings. The creation of the tribunal was endorsed by the Council in 
2007.40 There are 11 judges, of which 4 are Lebanese. Some scholars have 
questioned even the presence of 4 Lebanese judges, arguing that the
judiciary is simply too corrupt and politicized to guarantee that their 
decisions at the tribunal would be impartial.41
Controversy over the tribunal: Selectivity and politics
The tribunal is controversial because it is only designed to address such a 
limited set of crimes, given the extensive history of assassinations both 
during and since the end of the civil war, as well as disappearances and 
violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law 
37 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1595, UN Doc. S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005).
38 Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant 
to Security Council resolution 1595, UN Doc. S/2005/662 (20 October 2005).
39 Erich Foliath, “New evidence points to Hezbollah in Hariri murder,” Der Spiegel (23 
May 2009) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,626412-2,00.html, created 
controversy in Lebanon when it was published.
40 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1664, UN Doc. S/RES/1664 (29 March 
2006); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757, UN Doc. S/RES/1757 (30 May 
2007), which includes the statute; for an overview, see International Center for Transitional 
Justice, Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (10 April 2008) at www.ictj.org).
41 Interviews with anonymous sources in Beirut, August-September 2009.
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during the armed conflict.42 Many see the tribunal as politicized and unable 
to deliver accountability, and a range of civil society organizations which do 
promote the idea of some form of transitional justice or reckoning with the 
past do not support the tribunal itself.43 Families of the thousands of persons 
who disappeared during the war question the creation of a tribunal to 
investigate the killings of a few elites with no serious investigations into the 
fate of their relatives.44 Indeed, even the international nature of the tribunal, 
which in form appears similar to hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, but which does not have jurisdiction over any international 
crimes, might be called into question.  As the Regional Representative of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Lebanon 
observed, the internationalization of this particular judicial process is 
justifiable only with reference to either the inability of Lebanese courts to 
hear such politically sensitive cases, or because one or more of the 
perpetrators may be outside of Lebanese territory.45
Furthermore, many view the tribunal’s creation as having been motivated 
more by politics than a desire to pursue justice or confront a broader culture 
of impunity.46 In particular, France and the United States are said to have 
used the creation of the tribunal to isolate and in some sense “criminalize” 
Syria, which is seen by many as at least partially responsible for the 
assassination. However, the changes in administration in both countries 
have meant, according to one observer, that their interest in promoting the 
tribunal has waned, and their concerns about destabilizing Syria increased.47
Nonetheless, the faction most supportive of the tribunal is that led by Saad 
Hariri, the prime minister and former prime minister’s son, while the 
primary opposition faction allege the tribunal is politicized.48
Tribunal legacy?
There are numerous models of hybrid tribunals, and there is some 
controversy over whether the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is indeed such a 
42 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early Reflections,” pp. 1071-72; Author’s interview with 
Courson.   Author’s interview with el-Hélou. 
43 Author’s interview with Darwish (clear).
44 Pamela Badine,  Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth, (Beirut, September 2009), 
describes their view as it being a matter of ‘leaders vs. people’.
45 Author’s phone interview with human rights official on condition of anonymity.
46 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early Reflections,” pp. 1072-73
47 Author’s phone interview with human rights official on condition of anonymity.  see also 
Jan Erik Wetzel and Yvonne Mitri, “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Court ‘Off the 
Shelf’ for a Divided Country,” The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals, (2008), pp. 81-114, 111; Author’s interview with Fadel.
48 Author’s interview with Hamieh.
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tribunal, although it shares some characteristics with existing hybrid models.  
Generally, hybrid tribunals share a number of features: they are sited in the 
country affected by the violence or conflict to be addressed, they utilize 
international and domestic judges, lawyers, and other court staff, and they 
prosecute international crimes and may also have some domestic crimes 
within their remit.49 The STL shares few of these characteristics: it applies 
domestic law pertaining to domestic crimes of terrorism and murder, rather 
than international law crimes such as crimes against humanity or war 
crimes.50 It is sited just outside the Hague, nearer to other international 
criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, rather than in Lebanon 
itself, for reasons of security.  It does, however, include domestic and 
international staff, with Lebanese and international judges, and an 
international chief prosecutor, head of defense, and registrar.51 There is thus 
an argument for treating it as a hybrid.52
More importantly for our purposes, the primary arguments for the tribunal 
are quite similar to those made for hybrid tribunals. Advocates of hybrid 
tribunals often argue that they should be created to pursue accountability 
where the domestic judiciary is unable to address serious crimes of the past 
due to damage, incapacity, or bias.  They also argue that they help to 
address the needs of affected victims and society, sited as they are ordinarily 
in the country affected.  And they are often expected to have a capacity-
building and demonstration effect for weak or corrupt national judiciaries, 
through the inclusion of national staff, presence on the territory affected, 
and legacy-building through engagement with the domestic judiciary.  
49 Beth Dougherty, “Right-sizing international criminal justice: The hybrid experiment at 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” International Affairs vol. 80, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 
311-28; compare Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Wrong-sizing international justice? The hybrid 
tribunal in Sierra Leone,” Fordham International Law Journal vol. 29, no. 3 (February 
2006), pp. 472-506; Cesare P.R. Romano, Andre Nollkaemper, and Jann K. Kleffner, eds., 
Internationalized Criminal Courts:Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
50 Janice Yun, “Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Tribunal of International Character Devoid 
of International Law,” Santa Clara Journal of International Law vol. 7 (2009-10), pp. 181-
196; Marko Milanovich, “An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International 
responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice vol. 5 (2007), pp. 1139-52; James Cockayne, “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A 
Cripple from Birth?” Journal of International Criminal Justice vol. 5 (2007), pp. 1061-
1064.
51 The re is one international Pre-Trial Judge;  a Trial Chamber with  one Lebanese judges 
and two international judges, plus two alternate judges, one Lebanese and one international; 
and an Appeals Chamber with  two Lebanese judges and three international judge.
52 On possible criteria for treating a tribunal as a hybrid, see Neha Jain, “Conceptualizing 
Internationalisation in Hybrid Criminal Courts,” Singapore Year Book of International Law
vol. 12 (2008), pp. 81-95.
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM 14
This is a draft  paper.  
Similar arguments have been put forth in support of the STL, despite its 
presence in the Netherlands.  Its mixed character is defended as necessary 
due to the bias and corruption of the judiciary, and advocates emphasize 
their hopes for a wider legacy for domestic rule of law. The fact that the 
tribunal will apply purely domestic law but apply international standards 
regarding the rights of the defendant and due process, among others, has the 
potential to enhance domestic rule of law in Lebanon by having a more 
directly analogous relevance, at least for specific crimes.53 Finally, 
advocates hope that the tribunal will contribute to, rather than undermine, 
peace.54
It might be hoped that the tribunal, notwithstanding its mandate to try a 
limited number and type of cases, could re-open broader domestic debates 
regarding accountability and impunity that might eventually lead to either a 
real impetus for reform of rule of law and/or transitional justice processes,
open political space for discussions about the civil war, or even enable 
reconciliation processes.55 There is some evidence that the procedures of the 
tribunal have influenced some domestic legal discussions: following the 
release of four generals detained for the tribunal (see below), the minister of 
justice presented a proposal that would reform the Code of Criminal 
Procedure setting a limit to the period of detention without charge to a year, 
albeit much longer than the Tribunal’s 90-day rule.56 Advocates argue that 
the Lebanese judges serving on the tribunal will return to the country with 
expertise that will be shared with colleagues.57
Some argue that the tribunal could serve as an example of impartial justice 
in operation, and could result in justice for a political crime, both rarities in 
Lebanon.58
53 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early evidence,” p. 1078.
They suggest as well that the tribunal’s creation, justified in part 
with reference to the inability of the Lebanese judiciary to manage a case of 
this nature, or to act impartially, will draw attention to the need for judicial 
54 Wetzel and Mitri, “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” p. 111.
55 Wierda, Nassar, and Maalouf, “Early reflections,” p. 1077; Author’s interview with 
Fadel, who emphasized the possibility of the tribunal’s work encouraging reconciliation. 
Author’s interview with Cornforth.  Courson pointed out that the existence of the tribunal 
has prompted some Lebanese to speak more openly about the absence of trials for killings 
of ordinary civilians during the war.  Author’s interview with Iolanda Jaquemet, journalist 
(Beirut, September 2009). 
56 Author’s interview with Fadel, who thinks nonetheless that the tribunal is unlikely to 
influence wider legal reform. Author’s interview with Nadim Houry, Human Rights Watch 
(Beirut, September 2009), who noted that while this would be an advance if passed, it 
would not affect procedures of the Judicial Council so its impact would be limited. 
57 Author’s interview with Cornforth.
58 Author’s interview with Azzam.
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reform in the country.59 They note too that families of the disappeared have 
sought to use the creation of the tribunal as an opportunity to draw attention 
to their concerns.60 Any such impact, of course, will depend upon effective 
outreach, and as the office was launched in December 2009 it is as yet too 
early to assess its effects.61
However, the prospects for criminal accountability for other crimes remains 
unlikely so long as the 1991 amnesty remains in force, and leaders and 
fighters from various fighting forces who may be responsible for abuses are 
in office.62 It is not clear that the tribunal will have any further impact on 
rule of law promotion in the country.63 While some discussions regarding 
the possibility of a truth commission were initiated with the support of the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice and the International Federation 
of Human Rights (FIDH), one observer suggests that the 2006 Israeli war 
with Hezbollah interrupted these discussions, which have not been seriously 
resumed.64
At the same time, the selectivity of the tribunal’s mandate may undermine 
its legitimacy and thus its ability to promote the concept of rule of law more 
generally, in the absence of any processes to address the legacy of the civil 
war, the assassinations and disappearances (in Syria as well as Lebanon) 
since the end of the war, the 2006 war, or the May 2008 violence.  Some 
characterize the tribunal as simply demonstrating that there is a double 
standard—justice for wealthy elites and no justice for the rest of the 
populace.65 The rumours first that Syria, and later Hezbollah, were the 
primary subjects of investigation have generated concerns too about the 
legitimacy or expedience of any future indictments. Others have suggested 
that the funds spent on the tribunal would be better spent on domestic 
judicial reform.66 The lack of transparency at the tribunal is also problematic 
for its legitimacy—there was no public discussion of the selection process 
for judges.67
59 Author’s interview with Salloukh.
60 Author’s interview with Lynn Maalouf (Beirut, September 2009).
61 Email from Wajed Ramadan, Outreach  Officer (23 August 2010), outlining press and 
other events, including visits by several judges to Lebanon; Tolbert, “Introductory note to 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, p. 1151; Outreach page of STL website, at  
http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/146 (accessed 23 August 2010).
62 Author’s interview with Fadel.
63 Author’s interview with Azzam. Author’s interview with Hassan Krayem, UNDP policy 
specialist and scholar at the American University in Beirut (Beirut, September 2009).
64 Author’s phone interview with human rights official on condition of anonymity.
65  Author’s interview with Houry. 
66 Author’s interview with Houry, who suggested that many human rights organizations are 
of this view. 
67 Author’s interview with Houry. .
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Unique features
The tribunal has a number of unique features, beyond the deviations from 
the common characteristics of hybrid tribunals noted above.  It is 
noteworthy that it will be an internationalized court trying the crime of 
terrorism, given that there is no comprehensive agreed definition of the 
crime of terrorism in international law.68 It is also unique in that trials in 
absentia are permitted, which critics have argued is inconsistent with 
international human rights law.69 The final feature, if utilized effectively, 
might have the potential for wider impact of the tribunal, the provision for 
victim participation.70 Article 17 of the statute, copying the language of 
article 168 of the statute of the International Criminal Court, permits victims 
to present their views during the proceedings.  The purpose of inclusion of 
victims in such proceedings, according to one jurist, is not merely judicial, 
but also serves reparative and symbolic functions for the victims 
themselves;71 in theory, such participation might serve symbolic functions 
for the wider society as well.  However, given the relatively limited scope of 
persons likely to be considered victims for the purposes of the STL, in 
comparison to those considered victims before the Extraordinary Chambers 
in Cambodia, which has similar provisions, the impact is likely to be 
limited. In particular, the large number of victims and families of victims, 
including the disappeared, would not be able to make statements at the STL 
as the crimes to which they could refer do not fall within the remit of the 
court.  At this stage, in the absence of any criminal proceedings, it is too 
early to assess the impact of victim participation at the STL.
Legitimacy, politics, and stability: controversy over the 4 generals
68 Jan Erik Wetzel and Yvonne Mitri, “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Court ‘Off the 
Shelf’ for a Divided Country,” The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals, (2008), pp. 81-114;   Cockayne, “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” p. 1062.  
Specific terrorist crimes are defined in a range of international and regional agreements, of 
course.
69 Paola Gaeta, “To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In Absentia before the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” Journal of International Criminal Justice vol. 5 (2007), pp. 
1165-1174; Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, “Trials In Absentia at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: Incompatibility with International Human Rights Law,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice vol. 8 (2010), pp. 487-509.
70 Cécile Aptel, “Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice vol. 5 (2007), pp. 1107-1124; Jerome de 
Hemptinne, “Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings at the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon,” Journal of International Criminal Justice vol. 8 (2010), pp. 165-
179.
71 de Hemptinne, “Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation,” pp. 167-68.
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Given the political context and the politicized nature of its creation, the 
Special Tribunal is viewed by many as politicized and potentially biased 
itself.  This perception may undermine the impact of its operation on 
Lebanese politics, society, and discussions about accountability, even if it 
operates in an impartial and independent fashion.  Thus, for example, even 
its decision in April 2009 to free four accused who had been detained by the 
Lebanese government for the Tribunal who were pro-Syrian generals did 
not prove its independence to some. The four men, former head of the 
presidential guard, Mustafa Hamdan, security services director Jamil al-
Sayed, domestic security chief Ali Hajj and military intelligence chief 
Raymond Azar, were released after the prosecutor of the tribunal, Daniel 
Bellemare, requested that they be, on the grounds that there was not 
sufficiently credible evidence to make it possible for him to bring 
indictments in the legally mandated time frame of 90 days.72 A key witness, 
Mohammed Zuhair Siddiq, a Syrian army deserter, had recanted his original 
statements incriminating the four, and arrest warrants were issued for him in 
both Syria and Lebanon.73 Following his release, al-Sayyed repeatedly made 
statements calling into question the impartiality of the Lebanese judicial 
system and high-level politicians. Members of the March 8 faction say that 
the Lebanese judges at the tribunal itself are corrupt and can be bought off, 
although they provide no specific evidence for such allegations, and indeed 
the order by the STL would seem to indicate that it is not.74 One of the 
detained, al-Sayed, subsequently submitted a claim before the tribunal that 
he was the victim of arbitrary detention on the basis of libel.  The matter has 
been assigned to a pre-trial judge and al-Sayed has been provided with 
defence counsel.75
72 David Tolbert, “Introductory note to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Orders regarding 
the detention of persons and memorandum of understanding,” International Legal 
Materials vol. 48 (April-June 2009), pp. 1149-1151; Order regarding the detention of 
persons detained in Lebanon in connection with the case of the attack against Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/06 (29 April 2009), reproduced in 
International Legal Materials vol. 48 (April-June 2009), pp. 1152-1160. Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, “Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The First Orders by the Pre-Trial Jusge,” 
ASIL Insights vol. 13, issue 11 (7 August 2009) at www.asil.org.   According to the rules of 
procedure of the tribunal, persons cannot be detained without charges being laid for more 
than 90 days.
73 “Lebanon Frees Four Generals Held in Hariri Case”, Al-Arabiya.net (29 April 2009) 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/04/29/71647.html#001; “Jamil Sayyad to Saad 
Hariri: You are your father’s killer until you punish forgers Al-Manar TV (30 August 2009) 
http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=101267&language=en. 
74 Author’s interview with Hamieh.
75 Order assigning matter to Pre-TrialJudge Case No. CH/PRES/2010/01 (15 April 2010); 
Appointment of Defence Counsel. Rule 58 of the  Rules of Procedure and Evidence Case 
No. CH/PTJ/2010/01 (26 April 2010).
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The tribunal could according to some have a destabilizing effect on 
Lebanese politics, depending upon whom it chooses to indict.76 Thus Walid 
Jumblatt, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, predicted that there 
would be an ‘earthquake’ when indictments were issued.  Some observers 
are more circumspect, suggesting that the tribunal may have exacerbated 
existing political divisions, but that it did not create them.77 Further, while 
the tribunal was extremely politicized at its creation, given perceptions that 
it was a tool for the US, France, and others to demonize Syria, Syria has 
begun to rebuild relations with regional and international powers.  Thus the 
“shadow of the tribunal” may be lessened.78 Conversely, indictments could 
help calm the political situation, ending rumor and speculation, according to 
one observer.79
Conclusion
As one analyst asked me, “how can we establish peace with half a justice 
done?”80 Despite the passage of 20 years since the Ta’if agreement, it is 
difficult to say that peace is truly consolidated in Lebanon.  This has 
hampered efforts to pursue accountability, or even establish a shared 
narrative of the events of the civil war or under occupation, even five years 
after Syrian withdrawal.  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is ill-suited to 
engage the larger legacy of the past, given its limited mandate. And it is 
unlikely, on the evidence to date, to have the hoped-for effect of promoting 
efforts at accountability efforts or even truth-telling efforts domestically,
engendering frustration and disappointment among victims and families of 
victims and the missing.  Whether the tribunal will undermine stability, 
should it have any defendants before it, remains to be seen.
76 Comments from observer speaking on condition of anonymity (Beirut, September 2009).
77  Author’s interview with Lynn Maalouf (Beirut, September 2009). 
78  Paul Salem, “Lebanon’s Multiple Crises Risk Escalation,” (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Carnegie Middle East Center, 12 July 2010), at http://carnegie-
mec.org. 
79 Author’s interview with official of the European Commission.
80 Author’s interview with el-Hélou. 
